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COMMENT
AMENDMENT OF THE SEVENTH EXEMPTION UNDER
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
One of the final actions of the 93d Congress was the amendment
of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)' to alter significantly the
exemption under the 1966 Act 2 of "investigatory files compiled for
law enforcement purposes" 3 from the general mandate of the Act for
disclosure of information by governmental agencies.4 In an apparent
attempt to provide more disclosure than had been obtained under
the previous language of this seventh FOIA exemption, 5 Congress
may have removed an element of flexibility necessary to the useful-
ness of the investigatory files exemption.
Though antecedents for access to information can be found in the
historical concept of an informed electorate as essential to democ-
racy,' the common law developed no general right in all citizens to
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as amended by Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat.
1561.
2. The seventh exemption in the 1966 enactment covered: "(7) investigatory files compiled
for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a party other than an
agency. . . ." Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, § (3) (e) (7), 80 Stat. 250. The exemp-
tion now reads as follows:
"(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to
the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforce-
ment proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial
adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D)
disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record com-
piled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investi-
gation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence inves-
tigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, (E)
disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or
physical safety of law enforcement personnel. . ....
Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 1561.
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970).
4. Section 552(a) states that each agency is to make information available to the public as
described therein. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970). The second part of the Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)
(1970), contains nine exemptions. See notes 16, 17 infra.
5. One commentator suggested: "Exemption 7 has emerged as the mostrelied upon exemp-
tion to support withholding though other sections have also been used." Note, The Freedom
of Information Act: A Critical Review, 38 GEo. WAsH. L. RFv. 150, 158 (1969) (footnote
omitted). See also Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under the Freedom
of Information Act, 48 TExAs L. REV. 1261, 1277-84 (1970).
6. The words of James Madison are quoted frequently in decisions and in the legislative
history on the FOIA "Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people who mean to
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inspect government documents.7 Congress began a turnaround in
the law with the enactment of the "Public Information" section of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 8 but this provision,
enacted to allow broad disclosure, was used as authority to with-
hold public records This section nevertheless contained the first
provision for public disclosure of government information."0 In 1958,
Congress amended the Federal Housekeeping Act," previously in-
terpreted by agencies as allowing general nondisclosure, 12 to empha-
be their own governors, must arm themselves with the power knowlege gives. A popular
government without popular information or means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce
or a tragedy or perhaps both." S. PAuovER, TIE CoMrPLET MADISON 337 (1953). It has been
stated: "The right of citizens to know about the conduct of their own government, to see for
themselves the public records of the executive departments, certainly seems implicit in all
the theories of democracy and self-government upon which our system rests." J. WIGGNS,
FREEDOM OR SECRECY 66 (1964). See Hennings, Constitutional Law: The People's Right to
Know, 45 A.B.A.J. 667 (1959); Nader, Freedom from Information: The Act and the Agencies,
5 HARv. CIv. RIOHTS-Crv. Lm. L. Rxv. 1 (1970); 40 FoRDHANt L. REv. 921 (1972)..Introducing a
proposed amendment to the FOIA, Senator Kennedy stated: "We should keep in mind that
it does not take marching armies to end republics. . . . If the people of a democratic nation
do not know what decisions their government is making, do not know the basis on which those
decisions are being made, then their rights as a free people may gradually slip away, silently
stolen when decisions which affect their lives are made under the cover of secrecy.' S. REP.
No. 93-854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974).
7. See H. CRoss, THE PEOPLE'S LIGHT TO KNow 25 (1953). Some cases dealing with the first
amendment right to free speech under the Constitution contain language from which could
be derived tangentially an argument supporting a common law right to governmental infor-
mation: '"The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that
government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained
by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental
principle of our constitutional system." Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931),
quoted in, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964). See also Nowack v.
Fuller, 243 Mich. 200, 219 N.W. 749 (1928); Burton v. Tuite, 78 Mich. 363, 44 N.W. 282
(1889).
8. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238.
9. See H.R. REP. No. 918, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1963); 112 CONG. REc. 12,976 (1966)
(remarks of Representative Howard). See also Katz, supra note 5; Moss, Public Information
Policies, the APA, and Executive Privilege, 15 AD. L. Rav. 111, 113-14 (1963); Note, Freedom
of Information: The Statute and the Regulations, 56 Gzo. L.J. 18 (1967); 80 HARv. L. REv.
909 (1967).
10. The APA provided for disclosure of rules, official opinions and orders, and public
records, "[e]xcept to the extent that there [was] involved (1) any function of the United
States requiring secrecy in the public interest or (2) any matter relating solely to the internal
management of an agency. . . ." Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat.
238. The public records were to "be made available to persons properly and directly concerned
except information held confidential for good cause found." Id. § 3(c).
11. Act of Aug. 12, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-619, 72 Stat. 547, amending 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1958)
(Rev. Stat. § 161).
12. The Federal Housekeeping Act had provided: "The head of each department is author-
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size that the Act did not authorize withholding information.
Notwithstanding the addition to the Federal Housekeeping Act,
agency disclosure was still an exception rather than the rule. 4 Con-
gress therefore enacted the Freedom of Information Act " in 1966,
providing first a broad rule of disclosure," then specifying nine ex-
emptions from that rule of disclosure. 7 The Act nonetheless left
ized to prescribe regulations not inconsistent with law, for the government of his department,
the conduct of its officers and clerks, the distribution and performance of its business, and
the custody, use, and preservation of the records, papers, and property appertainingto it." 5
U.S.C. § 22 (1958) (Rev. Stat. § 161). In United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462
(1951), the Supreme Court upheld the reversal of a contempt conviction of an agent of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation for failure to respond to a subpoena duces tecum because the
Attorney General had issued an order which had made all official files of the Department of
Justice confidential under the Federal Housekeeping Act. See also Boske v. Comingore, 1?7
U.S. 459 (1900); Fowkes v. Dravo Corp., 5 F.R.D. 51 (E.D. Pa. 1945); Walling v. Richmond
Screw Anchor Co., 4 F.R.D. 265 (E.D.N.Y. 1943).
13. The 1958 amendment added: "This section does not authorize withholding information
from the public or limiting the availability of records to the public." Act of Aug. 12, 1958,
Pub. L. No. 85-619, 72 Stat. 547, amending 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1958) (Rev. Stat. § 161). See
Sperandeo v. Milk Drivers Local 537, 334 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1964); Olson Rug Co. v. NLRB,
291 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1961); Rosee v. Board of Trade, 35 F.R.D. 512 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
14. See note 9 supra.
15. Pub. L. No. 89-487, § (3)(e)(7), 80 Stat. 250 (1966).
16. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970). The Senate report accompanying the proposed bill stated:
"It is the purpose of the present bill to eliminate such [nondisclosure statements in the 1946
'Public Information' section], to establish a general philosophy of full agency disclosure
unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language. ... S. REP.
No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Seas. 3 (1965). The report further stated: "S. 1160 would emphasize
that section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act is not a withholding statute but a disclo-
sure statute. . . .There is, of course, a certain need for confidentiality in some apsects of
Government operations and these are protected specifically; but outside these limited areas,
all citizens have a right to know." Id. at 5-6.
17. Section 552(b) exempted matters that were:
(1) specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
the national defense or foreign policy;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by the law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the
extent available by law to a party other than an agency;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports
prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regula-
tion or supervision of financial institutions; or
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much to be desired, especially by its failure to clarify the meaning
of the exemptions,'5 including exemption seven for "investigatory
files compiled for law enforcement purposes."'"
Definitional problems pervaded the exemption. Congress failed to
explain whether "law enforcement" meant only criminal law en-
forcement or whether it applied to all laws. In a sense most govern-
mental investigations and studies are conducted to aid enforcement
of laws by discovering violations of laws or by providing the impetus
for new laws."0 An alternate construction of the exemption would bar
only disclosure of information generated by an ongoing investigation
for enforcement of the criminal laws. Nevertheless, courts uniformly
held that the exemption applied to the enforcement of all types of
federal laws.21
Use of the term "file" also proved troublesome. Since, as a mere
"collection of papers," 22 a file often might include materials not
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concern-
ing wells.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970). Professor Davis has noted: "The exemptions, of course, take back
a goodly portion of what the affirmative provisions give, so that the extent of required disclo-
sure usually depends upon interpretation of the exemptions." K. DAvis, ADmmsTRATIV LAW
TEXT § 3AI, at 69 (3d ed. 1972).
18. Professor Davis has stated: "After more than ten years of hearings, questionnaires,
studies, reports, drafts, and pulling and hauling, Congress wound up with a rather shabby
product. ... The drafting deficiencies are discouraging. They cannot be explained away as
the product of extreme complexity, intractable subject matter, or unruly struggles between
irreconcilable political philosophies. The failures are in the nature of inattention and indiffer-
ence." Id. § 3A.25, at 85-86.
19. In regard to the seventh exemption, Professor Davis has suggested: "Even the simplest
question may be unanswerable in the statutory language: Is law enforcement the purpose of
investigating the crash of a passenger plane? When the investigation begins no one may yet
know. If the evidence disproves in three minutes a suspicion of bomb planting, but if three
months are devoted to metal fatigue, is the file 'compiled for law enforcement purposes'?"
K. DAvis, supra note 17, § 3A.23, at 85.
20. See generally note 27 infra.
21. In Clement Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 282 F. Supp. 540, 542 (N.D. Ga. 1968), the court stated:
"IT]he legislative history of the Act itself makes it clear that . . . exemption [seven] is
not limited solely to criminal law enforcement but rather applies to law enforcement activities
of all natures." See also Aspin v. Department of Defense, 848 F. Supp. 1081 (D.D.C. 1972),
aff'd, 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 284 F. Supp. 745, 747 (D.D.C.
1968), aff'd in part, reo'd in part on other grounds, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 824 (1970). The recent amendment, Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(b),
88 Stat. 1561, strongly implies that "law enforcement" includes noncriminal laws by specifi-
cally limiting one subpart (section D) of the exemption to criminal law enforcement and
intelligence activities. See note 75 infra & accompanying text.
22. A "file" is defined as "a collection of cards or papers [usually] arranged or classified."
W3SsrsE's THIRD Nsw INTERNATIONAL DicnoNARY 849 (1969).
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investigatory in character,2s courts confronted two unsatisfactory
choices. They could inspect files in camera to segregate nonexempt
papers, thereby risking disclosure of exempted material because of
imperfect procedures or an inexpert decision. Alternatively, courts
could rely upon the self-serving classification of the material by the
agency and risk frustration of the Act's purpose by sanctioning non-
disclosure of nonexempt information. Some courts proved more will-
ing than others to conduct in camera separation of investigatory and
noninvestigatory materials,2 although most agreed that disclosure
of an entire file was not to be withheld merely because some of its
materials were within the exemption.s Practical difficulties of sift-
ing through voluminous file materials apparently deterred some
courts from attempting in camera file segregation. 2
23. Ralph Nader has argued: "Federal Trade Commission officials have also discovered
how to exploit this exemption: merely by instructing a secretary to open an investigatory file
and drop in the desired item serves to side-step the FOIA." Nader, supra note 6, at 7.
Professor Davis also suggested: "The Act is faulty in its use of the unsatisfactory term 'files.'
Much of the contents of investigatory files compiled for purposes that may include law
enforcement should not be exempt from required disclosure." Davis, The Information Act: A
Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHL L. REv. 761, 800 (1967).
24. The court of appeals in Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
889 (1972), ignored the in camera procedure as a means of separating materials that were
outside the exemption. Accord, Aspin v. Department of Defense, 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
The dissent in Frankel chided the court for ignoring this valuable procedure: "I am of the
view that the federal courts can amply safeguard investigatory agency procedures and inform-
ants by in camera examination of the files in doubtful cases." 460 F.2d at 820 (Oakes, J.,
dissenting).
Many other decisions have found in camera review an essential procedure. See Vaughn v.
Rosen, 454 F.2d 820, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 473 F.2d 109,114 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); Sterling Drug Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Soucie v. David,
448 F.2d 1067,1079-80 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Grumman AircraftEng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd.,
425 F.2d 578, 580-81 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
The Supreme Court, however, severely restricted the use of in camera inspection of
records in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), in which the Court reversed a court of appeals
mandate to a district court to inspect and segregate materials allegedly exempted by the
FOIA exemptions one (materials classified under executive order) and five (interagency me-
moranda). Reacting to Mink, see S. REP. No. 93-1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974), Congress
specifically authorized in camera review of material claimed to be within an exemption. See
note 74 infra & accompanying text.
25. The statement in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1973), generally is accepted:
"Congress never 'intended to exempt an entire document merely because it contained some
confidential information." Id. at 49, quoting Grumman Aircraft Engr. Corp. v. Renegotia-
tion Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See, e.g., Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 825
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Simons-Eastern Co. v. United States, 55 F.R.D. 88, 89 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
26. In Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 825-27 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court suggested that
the burden of facilitating an orderly and meaningful in camera review should be placed upon
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Another problem concerned the interpretation of investigations
"for law enforcement purposes" in relation to internal audits and
investigations within a particular agency. Most internal audits or
investigations have the broad purpose of aiding proper law enforce-
ment and administration since such audits could result in discipli-
nary action or criminal charges.2 Before exempting such an investi-
gation from disclosure, however, courts generally required the
investigation to have been focused "directly on specifically alleged
illegal acts . ..which could, if proved, result in civil or criminal
sanctions."28 Since courts interpreted "law enforcement purposes"
as referring to the likelihood of ultimate adjudication, 29 internal
the agency. The court in Vaughn suggested that the agencies should separate and itemize
thoroughly material within the files under scrutiny and that courts could perform the sifting
process through the use of special masters. Id.
27. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has stated: "[W]e immedi-
ately encounter the problem that most information sought by the Government about its own
operations is for the purpose ultimately of determining whether such operations comport with
applicable law, and thus is 'for law enforcement purposes.'.. . But if this broad interpreta-
tion is correct, then the exemption swallows up the Act . "Rural Housing Alliance v.
Department of Agric., 498 F.2d 73, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
28. Id.
29. In Stem v. Richardson, 367 F. Supp. 1316,1321 (D.D.C. 1973), quoting Hawkes v. IRS,
467 F.2d 787, 795 (6th Cir. 1972), the court stated: "'[L] aw enforcement is the process by
which society secures compliance with its duly adopted rules."' Most courts apparently
assume that adjudication is involved in law enforcement proceedings: "If further adjudicatory
proceedings are imminent, then the company's request may fall within the category the
exemption was designed to control." Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970). This assumption is implicit in judicial statements that
exemption seven was designed to prevent premature disclosure of files 'prepared in connec-
tion with related Government litigation and adjudicative proceedings.'" Black v. Sheraton
Corp., 371 F. Supp. 97, 102 (D.D.C. 1974), quoting H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Seass.
11 (1966).
In a system of law enforcement, adjudication is usually a necessary step in the imposition
of sanctions. Thus the following statement by the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit would seem to be in accord with the decisions that equate adjudication with "law
enforcement purposes":
For the purpose of analyzing the application of exemption 7 in the instant and
similar cases, it is therefore necessary to distinguish two types of files relating
to government employees: (1) government surveillance or oversight of the per-
formance of duties of its employees; (2) investigations which focus directly on
specifically alleged illegal acts, illegal acts of particular identified officials, acts
which could, if proved, result in civil or criminal sanctions. The applicability of
exemption 7 to each individual case is to be ascertained by making a careful
distinction between these two categories.
Rural Housing Alliance v. Department of Agric., 498 F.2d 73, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (footnotes
omitted).
That same court later enunciated a standard more inclusive than the "likelihood of adjudi-
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audits did not become exempt until aimed at particular individuals
or activity.
Perhaps the most fundamental problem inherent in the seventh
exemption concerned files retained beyond their originally intended
usefulness.30 When the file was in use in a pending proceeding or was
being compiled for an imminent proceeding, there was little doubt
that the file was exempt. 3' When the possibility of law enforcement
cation" standard. In Center for Nat'l Policy Review v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir.
1974), the court suggested that for administrative determinations of ineligibility for govern-
mental benefits, the "[l]ikelihood of adjudication is not the decisive determinant of whether
a file has been compiled for law enforcement purposes." Id. at 373. The court instead created
a "special scrutiny" test which may operate without regard for allegations of illegality or the
possibility of civil or criminal sanctions. "What is clear, however, is that where the inquiry
departs from the routine and focuses with special intensity upon a particular party, an
investigation is under way." Id. This test would seem to include internal audits or studies
that are nonroutine and have an element of "special scrutiny." In essence, the court deemed
-unimportant the "law enforcement purposes" requirement because it concluded that
"[w]here an agency. . . has both voluntary compliance and formal determination func-
tions, though the investigations may end up directed to one or both, the pertinent files are
'compiled for law enforcement purposes."' Id. A better view, in light of one of exemption
seven's main purposes, protection of the government's court cases, see S. REP. No. 813, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965), would be that the "law enforcement" purposes contemplated by
Congress do not include ternmiation of governmental benefits, but do include the imposition
of civil and criminal sanctions.
30. The first decision confronting the problem of the permanence of the exempt status was
Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1968), in which the
plaintiff sought an accident report from the Office of Occupational Safety of the Department
of Labor for use in a damage suit. There was no doubt in Cooney that the files sought were
investigatory and were compiled for law enforcement purposes; under the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 941 (1970), the Secretary of Labor has
the responsibility for investigating violations and enforcing safety regulations. Notwithstand-
ing the exemption's apparent applicability, the court stated: "But perhaps a more relevant
inquiry is not, for what purpose where the fies originally compiled; but rather, whether they
retain that characterization over four and one half years after their compilation?" 288 F.
Supp. at 711. The court answered the question only indirectly by suggesting that a balancing
of the interests involved was appropriate. By considering all the relevant factors, the court
precluded an absolute and permanent immunity from disclosure. See id. at 711-12, 718-19.
After the weighing process, the court conditionally denied disclosure of the "parts of the
report containing the observations and factual investigations of the officials of the Office of
Occupational Safety and conclusions as to the cause of the accident" subject to reconsidera-
tion upon a showing of the factual basis which gave the plaintiff a need for the report. Id. at
718-19.
31. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. HUD, 343 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (E.D. Pa.
1972); Benson v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 1144, 1146 (D. Neb. 1970); Barceloneta Shoe
Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591, 593 (D.P.R. 1967). Certain decisions propounding a
balancing approach to the exemption, however, seem to suggest that investigatory files can
be disclosed, even though law enforcement proceedings are imminent, if the public interest
in disclosure outweighs the interests in nondisclosure. See Pilar v. S.S. Hess Petrol, 55 F.R.D.
159, 163-65 (D. Md. 1972); notes 40-43 infra & accompanying text.
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proceedings became slight or nonexistent, continued exemption was
less justified, even though the language of the Act appeared to grant
a permanent exemption based on the file's purpose at the time of
compilation.32 Perceived inconsistency of such nondisclosure with
congressional intent apparently led some courts to reject the "clear
language" of the Act.33
Although the legislative history of the 1966 Act was far from defi-
nitive concerning the intended duration of the exemption, 3' courts
32. See Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
94 S. Ct. 2405 (1974); Evans v. Department of Transp., 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972).
33. In Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 P.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970),
the court was hesitant to acknowledge that the terms of the exemption focus upon the time
of compilation. The court stated: "At one time the [FTC] apparently intended to deal with
the subject of its proposed rule by proceeding against Bristol-Myers . . . for misleading
advertising practices. Thus there is some basis for the view that the items sought are 'investi-
gatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes.'" Id. at 939 (footnote omitted).
In Black v. Sheraton Corp., 371 F. Supp. 97, 102 (D.D.C. 1974), the court stated: "The
question then is whether the documents relate to that which can be fairly described as an
enforcement proceeding." The key word in that statement is "relate"; the literal approach
would require the use of the word "related" in reference to the time of compilation.
In support of focusing upon the time disclosure was sought, it could be argued that if no
law enforcement proceeding was pending or imminent at that time, then the file in retrospect
could not have been compiled for law enforcement purposes. If law enforcement proceedings
had been commenced, but simply had ended prior to the seeking of disclosure, then the
purpose would have been manifested and the exemption would apply. In essence, this reason-
ing requires a manifestation of purpose before the exemption would apply. No court has
utilized such reasoning to reject the literal approach to the exemption because it could require
application of the exemption long after enforcement proceedings have ended. Nevertheless a
court adhering to the literal approach has stated:
To prevent the unauthorized use of a § 7 exemption by agencies as a shield
against disclosure, there must be some method of assuring that the exemption
is being properly invoked. Here 15 individuals were in fact already court-
martialed on the basis of the Peers Commission Report, a showing which goes
beyond the bare allegation that proceedings were merely contemplated at the
time the files were compiled. Where, as here, enforcement proceedings have in
fact resulted, there can be little doubt that files were compiled for law enforce-
ment purposes.
Aspin v. Department of Defense, 491 F.2d 24, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Thus, though the court
applied the literal approach and focused upon the time of compilation, it justified its conclu-
sion by examining also the time of disclosure. This later focus would assure that law enforce-
ment proceedings actually had been contemplated at the time of compilation. The court in
Aspin, however, used the later-focus analysis merely to doublecheck itself. Other literal
approach decisions could not have utilized this doublecheck because law enforcement pro-
ceedings simply had never materialized. See Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 489 F.2d
1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2405 (1974); Evans v. Department of Transp.,
446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972).
34. The language of the Senate report indicated that the exemption could apply perma-
704
1975] FOIA EXEMPTION
have considered several policy arguments that might bear upon the
legislative intent: preventing disclosure of information gleaned from
criminal investigations may prevent the undermining of criminal
law enforcement;35 the exemption prevents premature disclosure of
government court cases;3" the exemption can protect the privacy of
individuals who are being investigated; 3 and protection of an in-
formant's identity through the exemption can protect necessary
sources of information." Viewed in light of the differing rationales,
the problem thus was one of balancing the public interest in nondis-
closure with the equally valid public interest in disclosure to accord
with the purpose of the Act.39
nently, but the report also seemed to contemplate a more narrow exemption, one relating only
to prosecution of law violators of a criminal nature. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9
(1965). The House report, however, deemed the exemptions quite broad, and specifically
stated that the seventh exemption should apply to all laws. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 11 (1966). Courts and commentators have displayed a general preference for the
Senate report because the House report was not published until after the bill had passed. See
Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS,
362 F. Supp. 1298,1304 (D.D.C. 1973); K. DAvis, AnDmesTRATn LAw TnArS §§ 3A.2, 3A.9
(Supp. 1970).
35. The Senate report stated: "It is . ..necessary for the very operation of our Government
to allow it to keep confidential certain material, such as the investigatory files of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation." S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965). Ralph Nader has
stated: "The intent of [the seventh] exemption was to protect investigative material which
if revealed would undermine law enforcement." Nader, supra note 6, at 6 (footnote omitted).
36. The Senate report described the exempt files as "files prepared by Government agen-
cies to prosecute law violators. The disclosure of such files, except to the extent they are
available by law to a private party, could harm the Government's case in court." S. RP. No.
813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965). Courts have taken note of the intent reflected in exemption
seven to prevent premature disclosure: "Of the nine exceptions listed in § 552(b), only (5)
...and (7) ...are aimed at preventing premature disclosure of matters pertaining to
litigation with an agency." Long v. IRS, 339 F. Supp. 1266, 1268 (W.D. Wash. 1971). See
Wellman Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427, 430 (4th Cir. 1974); LaMorte v. Mansfield, 438
F.2d 448,451 (2d Cir. 1971); Legal Aid Soo'y v. Shultz, 349 F. Supp. 771,777 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708, 711 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
37. An invasion of privacy could occur when a private citizen, seeking information about
another private citizen, is given access to materials collected by the government. In Cowles
Communications, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Cal. 1971), the court
stated: "[Blut more important in this day of increasing concern over the conflict between
the citizen's right of privacy and the need of the Government to investigate it is unthinkable
that rights of privacy should be jeopardized further by making investigatory files available
to private persons." Id. at 727 (footnote omitted). See also Center for Nat'l Policy Review v.
Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
38. Courts have realized that "[t]he informant may not inform unless he knows that what
he says is not available to private persons at their request...." Cowles Communications,
Inc. v. Department of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726, 727 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
39. The Senate report recognized the problem, but failed to find a proper solution: "It is
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In Pilar v. S.S. Hess Petrol," the court utilized a balancing pro-
cess, stating: "Having determined that the reports and files are
within the investigatory file exemption of the Act, our inquiry must
shift now to determine whether these particular files should be ac-
corded immunity from disclosure and, if so, to what extent ....
In determining the applicability of this privilege to the case at bar,
this court must weigh the competing interests asserted and attempt
to reconcile the conflicting policies involved."4 First, the court bal-
anced speculative interests: "Disclosure of the identity of the in-
formant or his statements [would] inhibit persons in the future
from informing .... ,,42 The court then weighed the immediate
interests: "[I]n the instant case where the government has no 'ac-
tive' litigation in progress, we believe that disclosure of the results
of the Department of Labor's HESS PETROL investigation will
neither endanger the government's fact-finding process nor jeopard-
ize any litigation. . .. "I'
Other judicial approaches to the seventh exemption have evi-
denced less of an attempt at balancing. One approach utilized a
narrow reading of the exemption to exempt the smallest amount of
information and to provide the broadest disclosure. Bristol-Myers
Co. v. Federal Trade Commission" exemplified a narrow interpreta-
tion, the court allowing disclosure upon determining that the inves-
tigatory file did not relate to a pending or imminent law enforce-
ment proceeding. 5 Other decisions construed the exemption
broadly, exempting material if the files were compiled originally for
law enforcement purposes, regardless of the subsequent termination
of law enforcement activity." Courts relying'upon the broad inter-
not an easy task to balance the opposing interests, but it is not an impossible one either. It
is not necessary to conclude that to protect one of the interests, the other must, of necessity,
either be abrogated or substantially subordinated. Success lies in providing a workable for-
mula which encompasses, balances, and protects all interests, yet places emphasis on the
fullest responsible disclosure." S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
40. 55 F.R.D. 159 (D. Md. 1972).
41. Id. at 163.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 164-65.
44. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970) (plaintiff sought production
of FTC materials relevant to a rulemaking proceeding).
45. The court propounded the following test: "MTlhe District Court must determine
whether the prospect of enforcement proceedings is concrete enough to bring into operation
the exemption. . . ." 424 F.2d at 939.
46. See, e.g., Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972);
Evans v. Department of Transp., 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918
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pretation nevertheless recognized to some extent the reasons behind
the seventh exemption, apparently realizing that a balancing of
interests may be conceivable.47
Still other decisions applied the exemption mechanically without
any attempt at interpretation, neither balancing interests according
to the disclosure purposes of the Act nor distinguishing factually
similar decisions. In Rural Housing Alliance v. Department of
Agriculture," the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held that if an investigatory file can be characterized fairly
as relating to or having related to law enforcement, the exemption
applies permanently. Relying upon Aspin v. Department of
Defense,4" the court ruled inapplicable the Bristol-Myers holdinge0
that exempt status ended with termination of enforcement proceed-
ings. The Aspin decision distinguished Bristol-Myers because, in
the latter case, the Federal Trade Commission "had made a con-
scious decision not to maintain any enforcement proceedings at
least two years prior to the suit to compel disclosure . . . ."61 Be-
(1972). In Cowles Communications, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726 (N.D.
Cal. 1971), the court rejected the narrow interpretation of Bristol-Myers and Cooney v. Sun
Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1968), see note 30 supra, stating:
"If these cases are authority for the proposition that any investigatory file becomes the subject
of private discovery when itis demonstrated that the file will not be used in alaw enforcement
proceeding, then I do not follow them." 325 F. Supp. at 727. The factual situation (the
plaintiff sought production of Immigration and Naturalization Service records concerning a
particular individual for use in a libel suit) may have led to the court's interpretation of the
Act: "The language of the Act is clear. It protects investigatory files compiled for law enforce-
ment purposes. A file is no less compiled for law enforcement purposes because after the
compilation it is decided for some reason there will be no enforcement proceeding." Id.
47. See Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 818 (2d Cir. 1972) (the court considered the public
gain that would result from disclosure and the possibility that the plaintiff could obtain the
information through discovery); Evans v. Department of Transp., 446 F.2d 821, 824 (5th Cir.
1971). In Evans, the court clearly evinced a propensity to balance the interests involved,
noting: "The desire of an individual to know the name of the person who wrote these letters
over ten years ago is totally submerged by the public interest, that is, the safety of millions
of the general public who use airline transportation and who must depend upon the Federal
Aviation Agency, by investigation and otherwise, to foster that safety." Id.
48. 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
49. 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
50. In Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the court ordered disclosure
of documents compiled for the purpose df proceeding againstthe manufacturer for misleading
advertising practices. The court admitted that the documents were "investigatory files com-
piled for law enforcement purposes." Id. at 939. See also notes 44-45 supra & accompanying
text.
51. 491 F.2d at 29. The court added: "The question in that case was, therefore, whether
the bare assertion by an agency that files were compiled for law enforcement purposes when
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cause enforcement proceedings actually had resulted in Aspin, the
court exempted from disclosure the material sought.'
The court in Rural Housing, however, while accepting the distinc-
tion in one paragraph of the opinion, rejected the basis for the dis-
tinction in the next paragraph, stating: "Whether the adjudication
or enforcement has been completed is not determinative, nor is the
degree of likelihood that the adjudication . . . may be imminent
.... " Reliance by the Rural Housing court upon such a distinc-
tion, which it refuted itself, cannot be justified, especially when
viewed in light of the disclosure purpose of the Act.,"
Another decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of Col-
umbia Circuit, Center for National Policy Review v. Weinberger,5
no enforcement proceedings were in fact ever prosecuted, would be enough to preclude disclo-
sure." Id.
52. Id. at 30. The court stated: "We therefore hold that an exemption under § 552(b)(7),
as investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes, remains available after the
termination of investigation and enforcement proceedings." Id.
53. 498 F.2d at 80.
54. Notwithstanding "the purpose of the [1966 Act] to establish a general philosophy of
full agency disclosure," S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965), the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit has refused to compel disclosure of materials relating to
major national incidents despite strong public interests in disclosure. In Weisberg v. Depart-
ment of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2405 (1974), the
plaintiff sought disclosure of materials compiled by the FBI following the assassination of
President Kennedy in 1963, requesting the results of spectrographic tests which had been
released previously. See 489 F.2d 1203, 1204-05 (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (strong reasons
suggested for allowing disclosure). The involvement of FBI files in Weisberg certainly mili-
tated against disclosure; even the Senate report on the 1966 bill, which is generally favorable
to disclosure, stated that FBI files were among those covered under the exception. S. REP.
No. 813, supra at 3. See also note 35 supra.
In Aspin v. Department of Defense, 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the plaintiff sought
disclosure of the Peers Commission report on the preliminary investigation of the My Lai
incident. Certain portions of the report were released to the public in March of 1970, and the
entire report had been given to the Armed Services Committees of both houses of Congress.
In both cases, the public interest in disclosure is strong despite the controversial nature
of the issues involved, especially in light of congressional rhetoric that "[a] democratic
society requires an informed, intelligent electorate, and the intelligence of the electorate
varies as the quantity and quality of its information varies. A danger signal to our democratic
society. . . is the fact that such a political truism needs repeating." H.R. REP. No. 1497,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1966).
55. 502 F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Center the plaintiffs sought disclosure of Department
of Health, Education, & Welfare files relating to review of public school segregation practices.
Because racial discrimination in federally assisted programs is prohibited by statute, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d (1970), a law enforcement purpose was deemed to exist in the compilation of
files. The ultimate penalty for noncompliance, however, is termination of the financial
assistance, and the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970), places "initial reliance on voluntary
compliance, and indeed requires discussion with local entities before formal steps are taken."
502 F.2d at 373. Thus a substantial argument could be made that the files were compiled for
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exemplified the most expansive interpretation possible of the inves-
tigatory file exemption. In Center, the court applied the exemption
upon a showing that the file was compiled for the purpose of an
"investigation,""6 a requirement met merely by proof that the
agency rendered "special scrutiny" by means of intense and de-
tailed inquiry into a particular situation.5 No showing that law
enforcement proceedings were contemplated or imminent was nec-
essary to justify permanent exemption." Because the Center and
Rural Housing decisions used a literal approach to the seventh ex-
emption, both the reasons behind the exemption and the interests
in favor of disclosure were ignored.9
The application of differing legal standards throughout seventh
exemption litigation in similar fact situations"0 to determine the
the collection of statistical data rather than for strict law enforcement purposes that would
lead to an adjudication.
56. 502 F.2d at 373-74.
57. Id.
58. The court in Center stated: "For a file to be deemed to have been compiled for law
enforcement purposes it is not necessary that an adjudication have been imminent or even
likely, either at the time the material was amassed or at the time disclosure is sought under
the FOIA." Id. Although most courts have assumed that procedurally "law enforcement
purposes" referred ultimately to an adjudication or required the likelihood of such, the court
in Center deemed that not to be the "decisive determinant." Id. at 373. See also note 29 supra.
59. The court in Center acknowledged the trend, stating: "Recent decisions of this court
construing exemption 7 have considerably narrowed the scope of our inquiry. The sole ques-
tion before us is whether the materials in question are 'investigatory files compiled for law
enforcement purposes.' Should we answer that question in the affirmative, our role is 'at an
end'." 502 F.2d at 372, quoting Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195,1202 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). By following a mechanical approach to the exemption, courts are freed from the
difficult task of weighing competing interests and performing in camera inspections. The
decisions broadly interpreting the 1966 exemption were supported by a liberal reading of the
exemption and by the certainty and objectivity intended to inhere in the exemption. See S.
REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965). The language of the exemption, however, is
sufficiently uncertain that conflicting interpretations are possible; in light of the overriding
purpose of the FOIA and the requirement that the exemptions be construed narrowly, see S.
REP. No. 813, supra, a disclosure-oriented interpretation of the 1966 exemption would have
been more reasonable. Nevertheless, as Professor Davis has pointed out: "Courts that usually
constitute themselves working partners with legislative bodies to produce sensible and desira-
ble legislation may follow their accustomed habits in narrowing the ascertainable meaning
of the words of an exemption, but in some degree they are restricted in following those habits
in broadening that meaning. The 'specifically stated' restriction operates in only one direc-
tion." Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Cm. L. Rav. 761, 783-84
(1967).
60. It has been suggested that the varying decisions interpreting exemption seven can be
explained only by the varying factual situations rather than by any underlying legal princi-
ples. See 41 GEo. WAsH. L. RBv. 93, 97 (1972). The factual situations in these cases, however,
do not explain the different results. The most important factual variable has been whether
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duration of the exemption demonstrated the need for the 1974
amendment of the exemption."1 The amendment specifically allows
in camera, de novo judicial review of agency classifications under
any exemption6 2 and mandates that "[a]ny reasonably segregable
portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such
record after deletion of the portions which are exempt .... "I'
These provisions reinforce the disclosure purpose of the Act, but the
changes to the exemption for investigatory materials must continue
to determine disclosure or nondisclosure in accord with the public
interest. Whether the amendment will remedy the failure of some
courts to balance the competing interests is unclear.
an actual law enforcement proceeding has occurred. In both Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding &
Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1968), see note 30 supra, and Bristol-Myers Co. v.
FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970), see notes 44-45, 50 supra, although the files were compiled
for law enforcement purposes, no enforcement proceeding had materialized, and in each case
this inactivity had continued for several years (two years in Bristol-Myers; more than four
years in Cooney) prior to the requests for disclosure. In Cooney disclosure was partially
allowed, and in Bristol-Myers the court held the file no longer exempt under the seventh
exemption. In two other cases, Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 817 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 889 (1972), and Evans v. Department of Transp., 446 F.2d 821, 824 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972), disclosure was denied, although the files in the first case
pertained to an investigation by the SEC which had been terminated by a consent decree,
and in the later case the information sought related to an investigation begun 10 years before
and long since terminated.
In all four cases, the seemingly "dead" files were needed for a pending or potential action.
In Bristol-Myers the documents were needed for a rulemaking proceeding, in Cooney and
Frankel for a civil damage suit, and in Evans, the plaintiff sought an informant's name to
initiate a libel action. To the extent that the court justified its actions in Evans by citing the
need to protect sources of governmental information and to prevent disclosure based solely
on curiosity, it can be distinguished from Bristol-Meyers, in which the FTC merely cited
general investigations as a rationale for holding a rulemaking hearing without disclosing the
investigations upon which it relied.
Use of a balancing approach, like that used in Cooney, see note 30 supra, or in Pilar v. S.S.
Hess Petrol, 55 F.R.D. 159 (D. Md. 1972), see notes 40-43 supra & accompanying text, could
have produced the same result as thatreached by the Evans court while providing consistency
in the selection of the legal standard. Nevertheless, no balancing of interests was apparent
in Evans or Frankel. The court in Frankel stated: "The conclusion that the § 552(b)(7)
exemption from disclosure applies even after an investigation and an enforcement proceeding
have been terminated is supported both by the authority of the cases decided under the Act
and by consideration of the policies underlying the Act. . . ... 460 F.2d at 817. In contrast,
the court in Bristol-Myers held that the company's request would fall within the exemption
only "[ilf further adjudicatory proceedings are imminent. . . ." 424 F.2d at 939.
61. Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561. See note 2 supra.
62. Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 1(b)(2), 88 Stat. 1561, amending 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a) (1970).
63. Id. § 2(c), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
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The new seventh exemption"' is a montage of several proposals."
Senate Bill 1142 and House Bill 5425 would have exempted "investi-
gatory records compiled for any specific law enforcement purpose
the disclosure of which [was] not in the public interest -: ..,"6 and
would have prohibited absolutely the nondisclosure of certain re-
cords.17 These proposals presented problems for defining the term
"specific" in relation to law enforcement"5 and the phrase "disclo-
sure . . . not in the public interest."" Nevertheless, the inclusion
of the latter phrase was significant because it required a balancing
of interests. Other proposals attempted to define more precisely the
public interest in disclosure by incorporating the reasons for the
exemption into the statutory language.70 The amendment enacted
64. See note 2 supra.
65. Neither H.R. 12471, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), the bill finally enacted, nor S. 2543,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), which was incorporated substantially into H.R. 12471, see S. RsP.
No. 93-1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), included major changes to the seventh exemption.
Predecessor bills included H.R. 5425, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1974); H.R. 4960, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1974); S. 1142, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1974). Proposals from the Administrative Law
Section of the American Bar Association and from the Department of Justice also were
considered. Hearings on S. 1142Before the Subcomm. onAdministrative Practice and Proce-
dure and Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on
Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 158, 273 (1973) (Cvol. 2) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on 5. 11421.
66. S.1142, 93d Cong., lstSess.§ 2(d) (1973); H.R. 5425, 93d Cong., IstSess.§ 2(d) (1973).
67. The proposed investigatory records provisions would have prohibited absolutely non-
disclosure of the following: "(i) scientific tests, reports, or data, (ii) inspection reports of any
agency which relate to health, safety, environmental protection, or (iii) records which seive
as a basis for any public policy statement made by any agency or officer or employee of the
United States or which serve as a basis for rulemaking by any agency ... ." S. 1142, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(d) (1973); H.R. 5425, 93d Cong., Ist Sees. § 2(d) (1973).
68. A statement in the hearings on S. 1142 by the General Counsel of the Department of
Defense suggested the problem:
The insertion ofthe word "specific" before the term "law enforcement purposes"
does little, if anything, to define or limit the intended scope of the exemption.
Presumably, any investigation for a law enforcement purpose must have some
specific objective in mind. We are left with the question of how specific a 'spe-
cific purpose' must be. If the intent is to limit the exemption to situations in
which the investigation is intended to culminate in a decision whether to
commence an administrative or judicial action against an individual, corpora-
tion, or other organization, then further clarification of the language is neces-
sary.
Hearings on S. 1142, supra note 65, at 288-89.
69. See, e.g., id. at 298-99, (report of Atomic Energy Commission).
70. H.R. 4960, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 103(c) (1974), would have exempted the following
records: "[1]nvestgatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such records would constitute (A) a genuine risk to enforcement
proceedings, (B) a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, or (C) a threat to life."
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follows this approach, naming six instances to which the exemption
applies.7'
Within the exemption and the six express applications are solu-
tions to some of the issues raised under the 1966 exemption. Inas-
much as the exemption now pertains to "records," not "files, ' 72 and
segregation is required where reasonable, 3 portions of entire files
now should be readily accessible.74 Because language in one of the
six instances specifically provides for exemption in certain criminal
law enforcement activities,75 the remaining instances apparently
apply to all areas of law enforcement, not just criminal law enforce-
ment. The six instances of the exemption also may reduce the likeli-
hood of permanent exemption because they tend to focus upon the
effect of disclosure at the time it is sought, not at the time of compi-
lation,7 although the Conference report accompanying the bill indi-
The Administrative Law Section of the American Bar Association proposed the following
exemption: "Investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings,
(B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) disclose the
identity of an informer, or (D) disclose investigative techniques and procedures." See Hear-
ings on S. 1142, supra note 65, at 158. The proposal by the Justice Department also would
have exempted files older than a specified number of years by providing:
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the
extent available by law to a party other than an agency; Provided, That with
respect to files compiled by noncriminal law enforcement agencies, or files com-
piled by criminal law enforcement agencies that are more than - years old,
this exemption shall be invoked only while a law enforcement proceeding or
investigation to which such files pertain is pending or contemplated, or to the
extent that the production of such files would (A) interfere with law enforcement
functions designed directly to protect individuals against violations of law, (B)
deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C)
disclose the identity of an informant, (D) disclose investigatory techniques and
procedures, (E) damage the reputation of innocent persons, or (F) jeopardize
law enforcement*personnel or their families or assignments.
Hearings on S. 1142, supra note 65, at 273. The conferees suggested in the report on the bills
enacted that old records should be released from exempt status by expressing approval of the
policy of the Justice Department, as reflected in its proposed amendment, of waiving legal
exemptions for investigatory records more than 15 years old. S. REP. No. 93-1200, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 13 (1974).
71. See note 2 supra.
72. Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 1561.
73. Id. § l(b)(2).
74. Nevertheless, the new language merely authorizes in camera inspection and segregation
of files; it does not mandate such a procedure. Courts may therefore deem such inspection
and segregation beyond their capability or desire. See note 26 supra & accompanying text.
75. See subpart (D) of exemption seven at note 2 supra.
76. Subpart (A) of the exemption focuses upon interference with enforcement proceedings,
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cates that some of the instances may justify indefinite exemption 7
These six instances, however, may provide merely further criteria
for applying the exemption mechanically. Although itemization of
the six instances may induce judicial consideration of the reasons
behind the exemption 78 a finding that one reason applies expressly
will preclude disclosure regardless of other facts surrounding
the request for disclosure. Had Congress specifically mandated
consideration of the public interests in disclosure or nondisclo-
sure,7 the amendment could have provided a more flexible stan-
dard." In light of the previous judicial inclination to construe
the exemption in favor of nondisclosure, 8' Congress could have
reiterated the policy of the Act favoring disclosure by adding
qualifying language to the six instances0 to assure a judicial
which, if terminated, would not be interfered with by subsequent disclosure of information
gathered for use in the enforcement proceeding. Subpart (B) would affect the disclosure
decision only where an adjudication was pending, the fairness of which could be altered by
such disclosure. Even where fairness might be an issue, if the adjudication had been com-
pleted when disclosure was sought, the material would lose its exempt status. In subpart (C)
material is exempted if its disclosure would be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
whether information would invade privacy in an unwarranted manner could change with
circumstances, and whether disclosure constituted an invasion could be changed by a passage
of time. Also, since this subpart relates to "personal" privacy, the nature of the exemption
created could be personal and might be held to lapse upon death of the individual whose
privacy was being protected. Subpart (F) relates to danger to law enforcement personnel and
thus should have no effect once any danger has passed.
77. One instance is the "confidential source" exemption of subpart (D) which would ex-
empt permanently the name and address of such a source from disclosure in general investiga-
tions and all the information given by such a source in criminal or national security investiga-
tions. S. REP. No. 93-1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974). Another exemption is the "investiga-
tive technique and procedure" exemption of subpart (E). If special techniques or procedures
are once used, the exemption would apply indefinitely, subject to those techniques losing
their "special" character. The legislative history indicates that this exemption "should not
be interpreted to include routine techniques and procedures already known to the public,
such as ballistics tests, fingerprinting, and other scientific tests or commonly known tech-
niques." S. Em. No. 93-1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974).
78. Indeed, Congress went beyond the reasons for exemption seven previously stated in
judicial decisions and legislative history. See notes 34-39 supra & accompanying text.
79. See note 66 supra & accompanying text.
80. A flexible standard may be necessary to protect valid public interests in nondisclosure,
as well as in disclosure, of certain information. A balancing test for disclosure would make
uniform the legal standard by which differing fact situations would be judged. See note 60
supra. The need for flexibility was one reason adduced for the presidential veto, later overrid-
den by Congress, of the 1974 amendment. See MESSAGE OF THE PRESENT OF THE UNrra
STATES VEromnG H.R. 12471, H.RP Doc. No. 93-383, 93d Cong., 2d Seass., at iii (1974).
81. See notes 48-60 supra & accompanying text.
82. Qualifying language could have been used in the following manner: The exemption
could have applied only to the extent that the production of the records would have interfered
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balancing process. 3 The new exemption instead focuses greater
attention upon factors favoring non-disclosure without any specific
inducement within the exemption to consider the public interest in
disclosure that pervades the entire Act.8"
It is the context of the Act which nonetheless may impel a
changed judicial attitude toward the exemption. The amendment
altered the Act significantly to provide increased disclosure' despite
adamant opposition from administrative agencies 5 and a presiden-
"substantially" with enforcement proceedings, would have limited "significantly" a right to
a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, would have constituted a "clearly" unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy, would have disclosed "positively" the identity of a confidential
source, would have disclosed "unique" investigative techniques and procedures, or "defi-
nitely" would have endangered the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel.
83. Surely the purpose of the FOIA requires that the seventh exemption not be construed
in a vacuum. Such a blinkered approach has been used, however, with previous statutes
attempting to effect general disclosure. See notes 8-17 supra & accompanying text. Speaking
of the 1966 exemption, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Ditlow v.
Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1974), stated: "[11f the documents in issue are
clearly to be classified as 'investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes,' the
exemption attaches, and it is not in the province of the courts to second-guess the Congress
by relying upon considerations which argue that the Government will not actually be injured
by revelation in the particular case."
84. The conference report on the bill attempts to infuse a disclosure context into the
interpretation of the exemption. For example, Congress specifically noted disapproval of
certain court interpretations of the 1966 exemption. See note 88 infra & accompanying text.
Congress also attempted to limit construction of certain terms, such as "investigative tech-
niques" to nonroutine techniques and procedures. S. REP. No. 93-1200, 93d Cong., 2d Seass.
12 (1974). Congress further limited "criminal law enforcement authority" in subpart (D) to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation "and similar investigative authorities." Id. at 13. The
conference report also mandates strict construction of "national security" as used in subpart
(D). Id.
85. The amendments require agency indexes identifying information, lessen the require-
ment of "identifiable records" to records reasonably described, attempt to remove fees as an
obstacle to disclosure, specifically authorize in camera inspections of records by courts,
allow attorney fees to be awarded to complainants in suits brought to compel disclosure,
create relatively short deadlines for agency action in response to requests for production of
documents, expedite appeals of district court actions as well as cases at the district court
level, substantially change the first exemption to require information exempted by executive
order to be related to national defense or foreign policy, provide for division of reasonably
segregable records, and require annual reports to Congress by the agencies of the requests
for information received by each agency. Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess., 88 Stat. 1561. See S. REP. No. 93-1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
86. The statement from the Department of Justice indicated that "[iln sum . - . we do
not believe that an amendment of exemption 7 is needed. . . ." Hearings on S. 1142, supra
note 65, at 273. Regarding the change from "identifiable records" to reasonably describable
records, the Treasury Department statement noted: "[W]e see no need for this amend-
ment." Id. at 282. In regard to the time for response by the agencies, the Department of State
declared the proposed bill "unworkable." Id. at 280.
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tial veto. 7 Moreover, in regard to the seventh exemption, the legis-
lative history shows that Congress clearly disapproved "court
interpretations which have tended to expand the scope of agency
authority to withhold certain 'investigatory files compiled for law
enforcement purposes.' ,8 The conference report accompanying the
amendment also attempted to clarify the six instances where the
exemption applies to preclude future interpretations inconsistent
with the general intent of the Act to increase disclosure. 9 If this
context is accorded proper weight in cases arising under the new
seventh exemption, additional legislative changes perhaps may be
avoided.
Disparate judicial treatment of the 1966 language of the seventh
exemption under the Freedom of Information Act led to an attempt
by Congress to clarify the intent of the exemption by amendment
in 1974. By itemizing six instances which justify invoking the ex-
emption, Congress perhaps has foreclosed one source of inappro-
priate extensions of the exemption beyond its intended use. Legis-
lative failure, however, to mandate consideration of the general
purpose of the Act when a court confronts one of the six instances
creates the possibility that the 1974 amendment may be applied as
mechanically as was the 1966 language. To perform the proper
balancing of varying public interests in disclosure and nondisclo-
sure, courts will find it necessary to look to the statutory context of
the seventh exemption, the increased disclosure directed by the
entire Act, as well as to the exemption itself.
87. President Ford vetoed the bill on Oct. 17,1974, on grounds that it could affect adversely
diplomatic relations, that it would impose unreasonable demands upon law enforcement
agencies to delineate line-by-line the material within its records which could or could not be
disclosed, and that the bill imposed unreasonable deadlines for agency response to requests
for information. MESSAGE OF THE Passnmr oF TH UNITED STATES VErOING H.R. 12471, H.R.
Doc. No. 93-383, 93d Cong., 2d Sees. (Nov. 18, 1974). Congress overrode the President's veto
by a substantial margin in the House of Representatives (371 to 31, 120 CONG. REo. H10,875
(daily ed. Nov. 20, 1974)) and a more narrow margin in the Senate (65 to 27, 120 CONG. REc.
S19,823 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1974)).
88. S. REP. No. 93-1200, 93D CONG., 2D SEss. 12 (1974).
89. See note 84 supra. See also S. REP. No. 93-1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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